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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!-- -*- XML -*- --> <!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC "-//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Bus Configuration 1.0//EN" "http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd"> <!-- CAGEFS-DBUS-HARDENING-MANAGED: this file is owned and managed by cagefs (feature_manager.py). The marker on this line lets cagefs recognise its own copy when it is deployed as the shared /etc/dbus-1/system-local.conf, so it never overwrites or deletes an admin-authored file. Do not edit by hand. --> <!-- CageFS dbus-hardening (CLOS-2704 / CLOS-4516): default-deny of org.freedesktop.systemd1 and org.freedesktop.login1 for non-root callers, to stop cross-user enumeration of sessions, units and process argv. Rationale, trade-offs and validation: see the CLOS-4516 commit / MR. WHERE THIS LANDS depends on the OS and is decided by feature_manager.py, because this is a default-deny that must override systemd's own per-method <allow> rules, and dbus applies the LAST-parsed rule within a precedence class: * Modern systemd (cl8+/Ubuntu) ships its policy under /usr/share/dbus-1/system.d, which dbus parses BEFORE /etc/dbus-1/system.d. So this file is dropped in /etc/dbus-1/system.d and reliably wins. * cl7/cl7h systemd ships its policy in /etc/dbus-1/system.d — the SAME directory — and the classic dbus-daemon parses that directory in readdir() (unsorted) order, so a sibling drop-in cannot reliably override it (CLOS-4516). There this file is deployed as /etc/dbus-1/system-local.conf instead, which system.conf parses AFTER the whole system.d directory, making this deny the last (winning) rule. Root keeps access via systemd's own user="root" allow (a higher precedence class than context="default"), regardless of location. --> <busconfig> <!-- Root keeps full access (system tooling, pam_systemd runs as root). --> <policy user="root"> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1"/> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.login1"/> </policy> <!-- Plesk's plesk-task-manager runs as the non-root system account 'psaadm' and legitimately queries systemd over D-Bus (systemd1.Manager.GetUnit, unit property reads); the blanket deny below would otherwise break Plesk task execution. A user= policy outranks context="default" in dbus, so this allow wins regardless of file/parse order. On non-Plesk hosts 'psaadm' does not exist: dbus logs a one-line "Unknown username psaadm" notice and ignores this block — harmless (verified: not fatal unless DBUS_FATAL_WARNINGS is set, which it is not). --> <policy user="psaadm"> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1"/> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.login1"/> </policy> <!-- postgresql-setup(8) drops root to the unprivileged 'postgres' system account and then resolves PGDATA by reading the unit's Environment property over D-Bus (org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties.GetAll, as issued by `systemctl show -p Environment`). The blanket deny below would refuse that read and break PostgreSQL cluster initialization (CLOS-4516 regression, Tests-all #7924). 'postgres' is a system service account, never a caged end user, so exempting it does not weaken cross-user enumeration hardening. A user= policy outranks context="default". --> <policy user="postgres"> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1"/> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.login1"/> </policy> <!-- glibc's nscd runs as the unprivileged system account 'nscd' (uid 28) and resolves passwd/group entries through NSS, which on systemd hosts includes nss-systemd. On systemd releases that predate the userdb varlink socket (cl8's systemd 239 — cl9+ uses /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser instead), nss-systemd asks systemd for DynamicUser= allocations over D-Bus, so every uncached lookup hits systemd1.Manager and the blanket deny below logs a "Rejected send message ... LookupDynamicUserByName" line. On busy servers that floods /var/log/messages (CLOS-6641). Scope: only the three read-only dynamic-user lookups nss-systemd issues, not a blanket send_destination allow (CLOS-5957) — so nscd still cannot enumerate units, sessions or process argv, which is what this hardening protects. The methods return only transient DynamicUser= service identities, never caged-user data. nscd is a system daemon, never a caged end user; /var/run/nscd is mounted into cages, but that is nscd's own NSS client socket and only serves passwd/group/hosts/ services lookups — a caged user cannot make nscd issue arbitrary bus calls through it. A user= policy outranks context="default", so these allows win regardless of file/parse order. Where nscd is not installed dbus logs a one-line "Unknown username nscd" notice and ignores the block (same as psaadm above). --> <policy user="nscd"> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1" send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager" send_member="LookupDynamicUserByName"/> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1" send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager" send_member="LookupDynamicUserByUID"/> <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1" send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager" send_member="GetDynamicUsers"/> </policy> <!-- Non-root callers: deny all systemd1/login1 method calls. New methods are covered automatically. A legitimate non-root daemon that needs the bus would get an explicit <policy user="..."/> allow above (see psaadm). --> <policy context="default"> <deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.systemd1"/> <deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.login1"/> </policy> </busconfig>